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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-1153 
_____________ 
 
 
ANITA PETERSON, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA; 
SPECIAL AGENT KEVIN COLGAN, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL; 
FRANK G. FINA, CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; 
WILLIAM A. HELM, CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; 
ROBERT J. O'HARA, SENIOR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; 
JAMES REEDER, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; 
KELLY KLINE, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; DANA KLEINTOP 
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 3:08-cv-02292) 
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik  
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 8, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 7, 2014) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Anita Peterson (“Appellant” or “Plaintiff”) brought an action against Pennsylvania 
state officials (“Appellees” or “Defendants”) alleging violation of her constitutional 
rights.  The District Court granted summary judgment for Defendants and denied 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions.  For the reasons discussed below, we shall affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  
 
I. Background 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural history, we recount only the essential facts.  An investigation by the Monroe 
County District Attorney’s Office of potential mortgage fraud resulted in a subpoena 
being issued to Peterson and her business, Mountain Valley Abstract, Inc. (“Mountain 
Valley”).  During the investigation, Special Agent Kevin Colgan learned that figures 
listed on the HUD-1 settlement statements did not match the check issued at the closing.
1
  
Peterson stated during her grand jury testimony that she never received payment from 
                                                 
1
 HUD-1 is a settlement sheet mandated by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures 
Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601. et seq.  See Bloom v. Martin, 77 F.3d 318, 319 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
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P&K Developers, but further investigation established that a check issued by P&K 
Developers was paid to the order of Mountain Valley.   
 Peterson was initially charged in a Pennsylvania state court with nineteen criminal 
counts including perjury, false swearing, tampering with public information or records, 
and hindering apprehension or prosecution.  Eleven counts were dismissed by the 
presiding judge at trial.  A jury acquitted Peterson on two counts, and was unable to reach 
a verdict as to the remaining six counts.  Defendants again prosecuted Peterson on three 
of the remaining counts, none of which resulted in a conviction.  
 Following her acquittal, Peterson commenced the present action against several 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania employees and a private citizen.  The remaining issues 
on this present appeal are whether the District Court erred in (1) denying Peterson’s 
Motion for Sanctions alleging spoliation; and (2) granting summary judgment against 
Peterson for claims of false arrest and false imprisonment.  
 
II. Jurisdiction 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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III. Analysis 
A. Spoliation 
 Peterson contends that the District Court erred in denying her Motion for 
Sanctions.  Peterson alleges spoliation by documenting the litany of failed attempts to 
obtain a transcript of Agent Colgan’s grand jury testimony.  Sanctions for spoliation of 
evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  See In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of 
Delaware, Inc., 489 F.3d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 2007). 
Spoliation occurs where “the evidence was in the party's control; the evidence is 
relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; there has been actual suppression or 
withholding of evidence; and, the duty to preserve the evidence was reasonably 
foreseeable to the party.”  Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68, 73 (3d Cir. 
2012).   
Upon a review of the record, we detect no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s ruling.  While Peterson has demonstrated to our satisfaction that the relevant 
evidence was not produced, she does not come close to showing the bad faith necessary 
to support a claim for spoliation.  Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326 
(3d Cir. 1995), and Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68 (3d Cir. 2012), are 
instructive here.  In Brewer, we determined that “[n]o unfavorable inference arises when 
the circumstances indicate that the document or article in question has been lost or 
accidentally destroyed . . . .”  Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334.  In Bull, we further observed that 
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“a finding of bad faith is pivotal to a spoliation determination.”  665 F.3d at 79.  “This 
only makes sense, since spoliation of documents that are merely withheld, but not 
destroyed, requires evidence that the documents are actually withheld, rather than—for 
instance—misplaced.”  Id.   
 Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that 
Defendants could not be sanctioned for spoliation.  
 
B. False Arrest and False Imprisonment  
 Peterson claims that the District Court erred in summarily dismissing her claims 
for false arrest and false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment.
2
  The District Court 
found that probable cause existed as a matter of law regarding two of the six charges, 
precluding the claim for false arrest or false imprisonment.  The two charges were false 
swearing under 18 Pa. C.S. § 4903(a)(1) and tampering with public records or 
information under 18 Pa. C.S. § 4911(a)(2). 
 This Court’s review of the District Court’s order granting summary judgment is 
plenary.  Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000).  Summary 
judgment is granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
                                                 
2
 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that: 
“[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 
256 F.3d 120, 130 n.6 (3d Cir. 2001).  
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must establish that [she] 
was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”  Kach v. Hose, 
589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).  To prevail on the claims of false arrest and false 
imprisonment, plaintiffs would have to demonstrate at trial that the police lacked 
probable cause to arrest Peterson.
3
  The existence of probable cause is determined by 
looking at the totality of the circumstances.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) 
(“[W]e reaffirm the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed 
probable cause determinations.”).  Probable cause does not require that the prosecution 
have sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, probable 
cause requires only “a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual 
showing of such activity.”  U.S. v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
Peterson here claims that there was no probable cause to believe that she engaged 
in false swearing.  Our review of the record reflects to the contrary, even viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to Peterson.  During the investigation, Peterson was 
                                                 
3
 Generally, the existence of probable cause is a factual issue.  Deary v. Three Un–
Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 1984).  Summary judgment can be 
granted, however, in an appropriate case on probable cause grounds.  Id. at 192.   
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asked about receiving payment from P&K Developers, to which Peterson responded 
“never heard from them.”  (App. 16 (internal citation omitted).)  The record, however, 
indicates that there was a photocopy of a check marked “from P&K Developers payable 
to the order of Mountain Valley Abstract in the amount of $635.66 dated July 13, 2001.”  
(Id.)  As the District Court correctly observed, Peterson’s ownership of Mountain Valley 
reasonably supports a false swearing charge, and undermines the theory that Agent 
Colgan committed an actionable constitutional violation.  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 
197, 213 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that liability for a 1983 false arrest claim cannot be 
sustained unless Appellant shows “that the police officer knowingly and deliberately or 
with reckless disregard for the truth made false statement”).   
Peterson urges this Court to attach significance to the magistrate judge’s 
conclusion that the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case with respect to 
this count.  But it is settled law that the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct 
is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of 
noncriminal acts.”  United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 491 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  See also Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 
1988) (“The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim . . . is not whether the person arrested 
in fact committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to 
believe the person arrested had committed the offense.”). 
Similar reasoning applies to the charge of tampering with public records or 
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information.  The District Court found that Agent Colgan had sufficient probable cause 
considering “that the HUD-1 forms filled out by [Peterson] were received and kept by the 
government; that there were inconsistencies in the forms; and that [Peterson] endorsed 
the inconsistent settlement sheets . . . .”  (App. 19-20 (internal footnotes omitted).)  
Peterson argues that the District Court erred on two grounds: first, defendants were not 
versed in RESPA instructions nor had obtained expert advice; second, HUD-1 settlement 
statements do not constitute public records.  Both arguments are unavailing.   
As to the first argument, the alleged lack of expertise in dealing with real estate 
practices does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.  It is black letter law that 
liability for a false arrest claim can only succeed if the police officer engaged in conduct 
reflecting a “reckless disregard” for the truth.  See Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 213 
(3d Cir. 2010).  While a lack of practical expertise may be considered as a factor in the 
probable cause analysis, the record viewed as a whole does not demonstrate that state 
officials acted in deliberate indifference to Peterson.  See Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 
F.3d 120, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] municipality’s failure to train police officers only 
gives rise to a constitutional violation when that failure amounts to deliberate indifference 
to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”).  
As for the second argument, Peterson failed to present it in the proceedings below, 
and it is therefore waived.  See American Cyanamid Co. v. Fermenta Animal Health Co., 
54 F.3d 177, 187 (3d Cir. 1995) (“It is well established that failure to raise an issue in the 
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district court constitutes a waiver of the argument.”).4   
 Therefore, we find that the District Court did not err in granting Appellees’ 
summary judgment motion.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we shall affirm the Judgment of the District Court.  
                                                 
4
 Even if it had been raised, the argument misses the mark given the broad 
language of the Pennsylvania statute.  See 18 Pa. C.S. § 4911 (“A person commits an 
offense if he . . . knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any record, 
document or things . . . required by law to be kept by others for information of the 
government.”). 
